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Introduction: 
Towards Understanding 
South African Constitutionalism 
Penelope Andrews & Stephen Ellmann 
A fter Nelson Mandela's release from prison in 1990, South African leaders 
.tl.from across the political spectrum embarked on an ambitious project of 
nation building and constitution making. The process was difficult and delicate, . 
driven by the obvious need to accomplish diverse and often contradictory aims. 
For the framers of the new constitutional order, encoding the desires and 
aspirations of all South Africans in one document was both a symbolic and 
substantive precondition for its legitimacy. Constitutions, after all, are generally 
a measure of a society's faith, but also of its fears. While reflecting the wishes of 
those who choose to govern - wishes associated with order and control - they 
must also incorporate the yearning for protection from those who are governed. 
They must mark the contours of the future while confirming the bitter lessons 
learned from the past. They must adroitly balance needs and aspirations on 
the one hand, with practicalities and limitations on the other. 
All this South Africa's constitution makers undertook. Their first step, a 
triumph of democracy achieved at negotiating tables to which no one had been 
elected, was the Interim Constitution. Born from South Africa's volatile history 
of repression, violence and discrimination, it was crafted through a protracted 
process of negotiation and compromise, a process often marred by widespread 
public disturbance, acrimonious debate and unspeakable violence. It laid out a 
structure for South.Africa's governance to last for five years, from 1994 to 1999, 
and specified as well the process by which the first elected Parliament, sitting 
as a Constitutional Assembly, would write a final constitution - a process that 
ultimately was capped with success in 1996. 
This book studies both the processes of negotiation and the results. It began 
at a conference of the Law & Society Association in mid-1994. At that time, 
South Africa's Interim Constitution had been in effect for just a few months. 
The work of writing a final constitution had just begun. As the organisers of a 
~eries of panels on the South African constitution, we aimed to bring the 
important news from South Africa to the attention of North American academics, 
and we hoped also to contribute to South African thinking the perspectives of 
a diverse range of observers and participants, black and white, South African 
and non-South African. 
1 
The Post-Apartheid Constitutions 
The road from that beginning to this book was longer than we thought it 
would be at the time. Some papers presented in 1994 were overtaken by events; 
new papers were written, some by participants in the 1994 meetings and some 
by other scholars and political actors. The new papers helped make this bo?k 
what it is now: a commentary on the processes that led, through the Intenm 
Constitution, to the 1996 Constitution, and a study of a number of central issues 
of human rights and institutional structure under the latter. There are other 
books on this subject, and rightly so, for the South African Constitution deserves 
the attention of constitutionalists around the world. But this book is, like the 
1994 conference sessions, an effort to bring together a particularly wide and 
cross-cutting set of views. 
We present here the reflections of politicians and academics, participants 
and observers. Three contributors were themselves leaders of the negotiation 
process, and on opposite sides: Roel£ Meyer and Leon Wessels for the National 
Party (NP), Cyril Ramaphosa for the African National Congress (ANC). Several 
others also participated in important ways in the framing of the new 
constitutions. They include Hassen Ebrahim, Christina Mu_rray, Kate Savage 
and Dennis Davis. A number have been actively engaged in implementing the 
new Constitution in governmental positions: to name only those not already , 
mentioned, Nicholas Haysom was counsel to President Mandela, Karthy 
Govender now serves on the Human Rights Commission, Firoz Cachalia is the 
majority leader of the Gauteng legislature, and Patric Mtshaulana was a law 
clerk to Constitutional Court President Arthur Chaskalson-during the Court's 
first·years. Others have pressed legal claims from positions outside the 
government. These include Bongani Majola of the Legal Resources Centre and 
Sandra Liebenberg of the University of the Western Cape's Community Law 
Centre. Some writers bring academic perspectives shaped by experience both 
in South Africa and elsewhere: Penelope Andrews (Australia, the United States 
and South Africa), and Stephen Ellmann, Diana Gordon, Jonathan Klaaren, 
Heinz Klug and Stuart Woolman (all with longstanding connections to both 
South Africa and the United States). One other writer, Carmel Rickard, brings 
the special insights of a long career covering South African law as a journalist 
and now as a legal scholar as well. 
Listing the authors is not, of course, enough to demonstrate the ways in 
which their essays add to the study of South Africa's Constitution. This 
introduction therefore offers an overview, necessarily summary and incomplete, 
of each author's contribution. We begin with the series of articles that focus 
primarily on the complex political and judicial processes that produced South 
Africa's constitutions. Then we turn to a group of articles that look closely at 
some of the rights that the new constitutions protect, and finally we discuss 
several articles that focus on the institutions created or reshaped by the new 
constitutions to protect these rights. 
Introduction 
The Processes of Constitution Writing 
Intractable conflicts around the world make it clear that South Africa's successful 
transition from racial oppression to democracy was never inevitable. The initial 
gulfs between the contesting parties were immense. Trusting personal 
relationships across the divides of politics did not come automatically, and 
sometimes did not come at all. The issues that had to be settled required all 
sides to rethink long-held predispositions - including such fundamental matters 
as the ANC' s opposition to federalism, the NP' s insistence on minority vetoes, 
· and both sides' hesitation about unfettered judicial enforcement of a bill of 
rights. Settlement also required creativity, as the country fashioned transitional 
mechanisms essentially without precedent anywhere in the world. Meanwhile, 
violence was always present and the possibility of far worse bloodletting was 
never far from the surface. How did So_µth Africa do it? 
Leon Wessels' s essay provides a part of the answer, Here, in an article aptly 
subtitled 'The Liberation and Confession of an Afrikaner', Wessels tells the story 
of his own gradual realisation of the injustice of apartheid and the massive 
changes that would be required to right that wrong. Wessels' s story, while in a 
sense the story of the reformist wing of the National Party, is also uniquely his 
own. He describes his effort to help a couple whose marriage was illegal under 
the race laws; the solution, arranged with the Minister of Internal Affairs, was 
to magically reclassify the 'coloured' wife as white, but Wessels's response was 
to be 'appalled by the farce'. In one encounter after another, Wessels listens to · 
the people he meets, and is moved by what he hears. Yet more than an open 
heart was required for the transformation that South Africa needed. Wessels, 
after all, was a politician. He apologised for apartheid at a conference in Oslo 
and at the same conference staged a handshake with Nelspn Mandela as part 
of an effort to avoid irrevocably losing the audience to Mandela. So, too, the 
negotiations that ensued were built on remarkable personal encounters -
Wessels describes his first meeting with Chris Hani and his swim with Joe Slovo 
- but also required 'a commitment to negotiate and to be loyal to the 
constitution-making process', an acceptance of the need for compromise, and 
the ability to candidly sell those compromises to one's constituency. Yet in the 
end the story Wessels tells is not one of calculation but of commitment, and 
this is nowhere expressed more clearly than in his recalling that he decided 
never again to sing the old national anthem Die Stem (The Voice of South Africa), 
but that on 26 April 1994 the coming of the new South Africa and the singing of 
Nkosi Sikelel' iAfrika 'allowed me and many other South Africans the freedom 
to sing The Voice of South Africa with emotion and pride'. 
Roel£ Meyer, writing with Professor Bennie Marais, also tells the story of 
the negotiations (focusing on the framing of the Interim Constitution) from the 
National Party side. Meyer and Cyril Rall}aphosa developed a relationship of 
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trust that clearly played a critical part in making agreement possible; Meyer 
observes that 'it was a necessity that Cyril Ramaphosa and I should trust each 
other in full. Our view became that there was no problem that we could not 
resolve'. Again, this does not mean that the government's negotiators were 
simply yielding to the truths brought home to them by the ANC. Meyer notes 
the government's tactical coups and failures, and emphasises that the ANC, as 
well as other parties, made substantial concessions to achieve agreement. He 
sees the credibility that 'we as Government negotiators achieved' as having 
made it possible for them to take firm stands in the negotiations, and to [keep] 
our bargaining power after we had lost all our partners'. Meyer's account also 
indirectly reveals, however, how crucial and sometimes difficult it must have 
been for the negotiators who grasped the urgency of change to bring their 
party with them. He tells us, for instance that it took nine months for him to get 
the government's consent to the idea of the government of national unity. 
Similarly, Meyer tells us that a constitutional framework for the Interim 
Constitution, developed by Professor Francois Venter, became 'the backbone 
of our negotiations ... The government approved of it, thus it had cabinet status, 
and I could bind my colleagues to it.' Meyer also comments that his relationship 
with his 'principal', F W de Klerk, was important to the negotiation process. 
[While] Meyer does not elaborate on this point Wessels's comment is striking: 
'[While] we had won the internal arguments and debates at the World Trade 
Centre negotiations with the assistance of De Klerk, we had not always done 
' so under his leadership.' 
Cyril Ramaphosa tells the story of the negotiations through to the adoption 
of the proposed text of the final Constitution on 8 May 1996. His account is less 
personal than Meyer's or Wessels' s, though he too mentions the 'disarming 
exchanges' at the first negotiation between the government and the ANC at 
Groote Schuur in 1990, and the 'smiles and handshakes all round' after the 
Constitutional Assembly vote on 8 May. Ramaphosa reminds us very firmly of 
the extent of the divisions between the National Party and the ANC (he also 
discusses the ANC's dealings with other parties, from the 'ANC's persistence 
in engaging in bilaterals with the right wing' to the dispute with the Inkatha 
Freedom Party over international mediation)". He sees the government as a 
very reluctant negotiator, aiming to lock the ANC 'into protracted, fruitless 
negotiations, while the structures of the ANC on the ground would have been 
rendered ineffective by the ongoing violence', which itself was' an orchestrated 
element of the NP' s negotiating strategy'. It is all the more remarkable, in light 
of this account of the conflicting strategies of the two sides, that the negotiators 
were able to establish the degree of personal trust that they did. While 
Ramaphosa emphasises that the ANC set much of the course of the negotiations, 
he recognises that it also made concessions. It seems, moreover, that making 
these concessions was not always easy. Ramaphosa acknowledges that '[t]he 
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lines of communication between negotiators and their constituencies - between 
the ANC leadership and the membership -were generally poor'. In particular, 
it appears that the idea of a government of national unity was difficult for both 
sides to accept. Meyer, as already noted, had trouble selling it to his constituency, 
while Ramaphosa says that Joe Slovo had 'the unenviable task' of winning 
ANC support for this and related concessions. Ramaphosa writes that the 
endorsement of these concessions 'was a brave and far-sighted move for the 
ANC, preceded by much frank debate and soul searching'. Much the same 
might well be said of central decisions by the other side. 
-The negotiators' accounts of personal interaction and strategic clashes 
underline the question of whether the South African constitutions should be 
seen, as Hassen Ebrahim puts it, as 'the product of the power of persuasion or 
the persuasion of power'. Certainly, as Ebrahim makes clear, power was wielded. 
The parties approached the task of creating an Interim Constitution with the 
recognition that neither side could simply force its will on the other, but each 
side, or elements on each side, continued to seek leverage with the means at its 
disposal. As Ebrahim observes, '[a]lmost every massacre during this period 
took place either before a postponement in talks or after a major breakthrough'. 
The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) pressed its case by 
'organising mass action, boycotts, strikes and stay-aways'. And the right wing 
actually invaded the negotiations at the World Trade Centre. Ebrahim 
emphasises what Ramaphosa's account implies: that mistrust as well as trust 
Was part of the negotiation process. Indeed, at one point 'Ramaphosa exchanged 
such harsh words with Meyer that it was feared that a nearly complete 
agreementwould be placed in the balance'. Yet true persuasion was also an 
important part of the process. As Ebrahim reminds us, Nelson Mandela himself 
had initiated negotiations from his prison cell. Thabo Mbeki apparently talked 
the National Party into accepting 'the importance of an interim government to 
manage the transition', while Roel£ Meyer pressed on the ANC an argument 
that there needed to be an interim constitution as well. Indeed, Ebrahim 
maintains that 'it is the fact that [the Constitution] represents a comfortable 
collection of previously intractable political positions that provides it with its 
vibrant quality'. 
As several of the contributors emphasise, there was more to this process 
than simply an interaction, reasoned or forced, between negotiators. The public 
Was also involved. Christina Murray, for example, recounts the multi-faceted 
campaign by the Constitutional Assembly (CA) to make all South Africans aware 
of the constitution-writing process. 'You've made your mark now have your 
say,' the CA told the country. Many did have their say- more than two million 
~eople submitted comments, whether in petitions, technical arguments, or less 
finely crafted writing that 'captured the aspirations of a young nation on the 
brink of change'. The CA asserted in a poster that 'The Constitution is being 
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written by the most important person in the country: You!', but Murray 
comments that this poster 'might be criticised for being misleading'. She 
acknowledges that the two million people who commented did not directly 
shape the Constitution, but she maintains that the campaigns for public input 
nevertheless had meaning: they 'might' facilitate "ownership" of the Consti-
tution by all South Africans by ensuring that it was not drafted by an isolated 
political elite, and by fostering an active interest in it in all communities'. At the 
same time, a 'technical refinement team' paradoxically had the rather 
controversial task of writing the document in plain English, a process that aimed 
to deliver to the South African people a Constitution they might more fully 
own because they could more easily read it. The same team aimed 'to give the 
text an active and enabling tone rather than a regulatory tone', and scoured 
the text's language to free it from linguistic gender discrimination. 
While the Constitutional Assembly sought to give the public 'ownership' 
of the new basic law, various groups from civil society- in American parlance, 
interest groups - sought to place their imprint on particular aspects of the 
Constitution. For example, the prohibition of unfair discrimination based on 
sexual orientation may reflect the impact of advocates for gay and lesbian rights. 
Heinz Klug discusses the influence on the Interim Constitution of women's 
groups, who successfully prevailed over another civil society group- traditional 
African leaders - in giving gender equality primacy over the claims of 
discriminatory tradition. Similarly, as Klug recounts, white and black ethnic 
groups, in particular conservative Afrikaners and Zulus supporting the Inkatha 
Freedom Party, also won protections for their claims, notably in the 
Constitutional Principles attached to the Interim Constitution that obliged the 
negotiators of the final constitution to respect, or at least entertain, some claims 
for group self-determination within the new South Africa. Klug also observes 
that with the transition 'from a non-elected negotiations forum' - responsible 
for the Interim Constitution - to the elected Constitutional Assembly that wrote 
the final Constitution, 'the emphasis of participation [shifted] away from mass 
action or public demonstrations towards a more individualistic, yet equally 
active, form of participation through discussion meetings and the making of 
formal submissions to the CK In late 1995, he tells us, only 'groups who felt 
that they were not adequately represented' were demonstrating, although 
COSATU did return to earlier modes of politics in the last days of April 1996 
when it called a national strike on the lockout issue. Whatever the mode of 
civil society intervention, it remained significant; Ebrahim observes that the 
last three issues to be resolved in 1996, dealing with the supposed right to 
lockout, the constitutional protection of property and the right to single-
language education, were all 'issues around which the civil society lobby was 
most vigorous'. 
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Katharine Savage's essay illuminates these complex interactions. It begins 
with a detailed outline of the for)llal Constitutional Assembly structures, as 
well as a description of the different formats of informal negotiations, 
multilateral and bilateral. These structures were certainly important - the CA 
was a much more stable structure than the Convention for a Democratic South 
Africa, and the informal channels were quite solid as well, so that, as Murray 
says, '[o]ccasionally one would encounter Ramaphosa himself settled 
comfortably with a whisky discussing ways of resolving seemingly intractable 
problems with his National Party counterpart, Roel£ Meyer'. But all the 
experience of successful negotiation, and all the structures, did not suffice to 
bring the parties in the CA to agreement without crisis in the final days. 
Savage focuses on 'three tightly negotiated and highly contested clauses' 
dealing with education, property and the lockout. Her account emphasises the 
ANC's newly attained power, and its willingness to use that power; the ANC 
insisted, for example, that there should be no right to single-language schools, 
and ultimately extracted the NP's agreement to this as part of the final multi-
issue compromise. At the same time, Savage points to the ANC's need for 
consensus (Murray similarly emphasises that no one wanted to settle the 
Constitution by referendum instead of negotiation) and illustrates theANC's 
Willingness to compromise even on some very important questions. 
The complexity of the negotiations and the lengths to which the parties 
were prepared to go to try to find common ground are reflected in Savage's 
detailed account of negotiations on the property clause. The ANC entered the 
negotiations over the final Constitution determined to rectify what were seen 
as excessive concessions made on the issue of a right to property in the Interim 
Constitution.1 Savage reports that the ANC carefully 'ensure[d] that the views 
of the major constituencies lobbying the party were canvassed until hours before 
the clause was finalised'. But while the ANC resisted a constitutional' guarantee' 
of property, in the course of elaborate negotiations it repeatedly offered to accept 
language obliging the state to 'respect property' or' the institution of property'. 
The National Party approached acceptance of similar language in a negotiating 
draft which it 'marked as a "non-paper'", to which the ANC chose to resr,ond 
despite its questionable status. In the end, the ANC refused to go further than 
this, and the National Party drew back from it, preferring no entrenchment of 
any property right to language, merely requiring respect for the institution of 
property. Then, ironically, in the final days of negotiations the parties almost 
deadlocked over a different property issue, namely whether land reform and 
similar measures could be enacted despite the property provisions agreed upon 
and without satisfying the usual requirements for limitations on constitutional 
rights. On this issue, perhaps ultimately a more important one than the choice 
0
~ language endorsing or not endorsing property rights as such, the ANC 
)'lelded, agreeing that land reform limitations on property rights would have 
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to satisfy the usual test for limiting any right. 'The result,' Savage writes, 'left 
certain ANC negotiators and advisers who had been integrally involved in 
negotiations on the clause bitterly unhappy.' 
Even these intricate interactions do not reflect the full complexity of the 
forces shaping South Africa's new Constitutions. The detailed minuet of the 
negotiations only took place because the parties had chosen, or been driven to 
the negotiating table in the first place. That was hardly inevitable; the vision of 
South Africa's leaders, including Nelson Mandela and F W de Klerk, the West's 
pressure on South Africa's government, and the Communist East's decline as a 
source of support for the ANC, all contributed to the parties' arrival at the 
table. There they undertook a somewhat remarkable task, namely to use law to 
reform South Africa. The negotiators sought to give the South African people· 
ownership of this new basic law, and they profoundly reshaped South Africa's 
legal system by establishing constitutional supremacy over the legislature and 
creating a new Constitutional Court. Nevertheless, they maintained some 
measure of continuity with a system in which, as Martin Chanock has 
emphasised, law's claims to liberal virtue fitted poorly with its role in a vicious 
system of subjugation.2 
Both the government and the ANC came to the notion of judicially 
enforceable human rights quite late. Heinz Klug emphasises the extent to which 
the negotiators were constrained by an international, 'post-cold war hegemony 
of an American-style constitutionalism'. Klug writes that '[f]or the ANC the 
shift from a rhetoric of people's power, democratic centralism and state socialist 
models ... to an embracing of constitutional democracy and a bill of rights was 
grounded in the movement's ability to draw on its own rights-based tradition'. 
Dennis Davis is perhaps more sceptical. While observing that for the National 
Party 'a Bill of Rights became one of the major instruments with which ... [it] 
sought to achieve a nonracial society with a minimum of transformative 
potential,' he argues that the ANC initially endorsed judicial enforcement only 
of traditional, 'first generation' rights and reads leading ANC figures as 
otherwise aiming at centralised social reconstruction for which judicial intrusion 
was seen as a potential hindrance. 
Davis's scepticism makes the ultimate elaboration and protection of rights 
in the Constitutions seem all the more remarkable. How did it ever come about? 
He suggests that the initial impetus towards comprehensive rights protection 
in the Interim Constitution came not from the politicians but from the members 
of the 'Technical Committee', who broadly construed their drafting mandate 
and thereby gave the National Party, already eager to enact as many limits on 
the new government's power as possible, a 'supreme tactical advantage'. But 
Davis .also emphasises that the NP and ANC found common ground in 
(somewhat ambiguously) limiting the Bill of Rights to vertical rather than 
horizontal application, a result that he believes met the NP' s desire to insulate 
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a sphere of private life and privilege from constitutional scrutiny, while also 
according with ANC desires to have a constitutionally free hand in making 
socio-economic reforms. The second time around, however, in the negotiations 
for the final Constitution, the ANC made clear that' exclusive verticality was a 
non-starter' and '[b]ecause the political temperature had not been raised on 
this issue, the legal experts had considerable scope for imposing their own 
solution'. At the start of April 1996, in a negotiating session at the seaside resort 
of Arniston, while politicians focused on other issues, Davis reports that two 
~echnical advisors, Halton Cheadle and Etienne Mureinik, 'had agreed that the 
issue of horizontality should be resolved by way of a mediating role for the 
common law'. This agreement led to the final Constitution's section 8, which 
makes clear that the Bill of Rights can apply to private relationships and, in 
Davis's view, directs that this application take place through development of 
the common Iaw rather than through 'a direct form of horizontality'. Davis 
sees this provision as potentially revolutionary, but also argues that in the years 
after its adoption it has had little impact, and concludes with the observation 
th~t _'whether the demand for change proves stronger than the tenacity of 
existing legal traditions will probably determine the extent of the influence of 
th~ 1996 Constitution in the reconstitution of South African society'. (Later in 
this volume, Ellmann offers another analysis of this clause and its potential 
meaning.) 
. A_ reader unfamiliar with South African history might be forgiven for 
thi~~ng at this point that the South African miracle was the result entirely of 
political actiop, mediated by skilful technical advice. Perhaps the most 
remarkable of the mechanisms South Africa devised for its own transition, 
however, was its use of the judiciary. The multi-party negotiations that produced 
the Interim Constitution also produced a set of Constitutional Principles that 
Would bind the drafters of the final Constitution, and an institution, the 
Constitutional Court, which would have the power to reject a draft that did 
not comply with those principles. The Constitutional Court, itself a creation of 
the Interim Constitution, was the first South African court to be chosen after 
the end of apartheid and the first to exercise without challenge the power to 
hold acts of other branches of the government unconstitutional. It was also 
perhaps the first constitutional court anywhere in the world to be granted the 
Power to hold a constitution unconstitutional. 
t . Carmel Rickard tells the story of the Constitutional Court's performance of 
hi~ duty. To some extent, of course, this story cannot be known, because the 
deliberations of the Court are confidential. In another respect, this story is 
alr~ady available to every reader of the Constitutional Court's judgements, 
Which state the Court's reasoning and conclusions in detail. But Rickard, who 
attended the two weeks of oral argument that began on 1 July 1996, is able to 
tell a part of the story that otherwise (because of the lack of usable official 
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recordings of the arguments) would be lost to us. This is the story of the justices' 
public engagement with the issues of certification. As she emphasises, this is a 
story of justices expressing questions and uncertainties, often in vivid language; 
it is in marked contrast to the formal story told in the studiedly cool language 
of the Court's decisions. The justices wrestle with a series of profound questions, 
including the degree of deference due to the Constitutional Assembly; the 
problem of interpreting ambiguous constitutional provisions and of binding 
future courts to adhere to the certification judgement's interpretations; and 
the task of understanding and respecting the dictates of the 'solemn pact' by 
which the negotiators of the Interim Constitution bound the Constitutional 
Assembly. As Rickard also emphasises, however, the certification story is not 
only a story of the justices' interaction with counsel. The court took 
extraordinary steps to elicit public comments, and ultimately heard oral 
argument from one lay person (Mr Beema Naidoo, who argued that Indian 
languages were not sufficiently protected in the new Constitution). Organised 
political parties also played a crucial part. The National Party and the Democratic 
Party voted for the Constitution in the Constitutional Assembly but challenged 
it in court; this two-front strategy now seems to be accepted practice. The 
Inkatha Freedom Party and the Conservative Party, each of which had pulled 
out of the negotiations process, both opted in to the certification litigation. 
It might well have been feared that entrusting to a court the authority to 
hold the Constitution unconstitutional would impose on the justices duties 
that were essentially political rather than judicial - perhaps most clearly, the 
task of weighing whether provincial powers in the new Constitution were 
substantially less than those in the Interim Constitution, a task that consumed 
a great deal of the court's attention - and that the result would be to delegitimise 
the Court rather than to legitimise the Constitution. In fact, however, the 
Constitutional Court, sympathetic as it clearly is to the new order, rejected the 
first version of the final Constitution. This decision was accepted calmly by the 
political authorities, who rewrote the draft to meet the Court's specifications. 
Rickard suggests that the success of the entire process reflected the Court's 
own' growing reputation for independence', its welcoming of wide participation 
in the process, its careful choice of tone in the ultimate judgement, as well as 
the coverage by the media and the response of the politicians. Using a metaphor 
offered by the late Ismail Mohamed during the oral argument, she writes that 
the certification process brought the airplane of the Constitution down 'safely 
within the lights of the runway'. 
Constitutional Rights 
The six articles focusing on human rights in the new constitutions offer a 
window on the achievements and aspirations, but also the possible limitations, 
of the new basic law. While by no means a survey of all of the important rights 
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issues now facing South Africa, these articles illuminate several of the most 
important fields now in development. They address the right to citizenship; 
the right to equality, in particular with respect to gender; rights to cultural 
freedom; socioeconomic rights; the applicability of the Bill of Rights to private 
actors; and free speech rights, in particular in the courts. 
Jonathan Klaaren takes up a right that in the United States has been called 
'the right to have rights',3 the right to citizenship. In South Africa, the right to 
citizenship is in a sense less fundamental since, as Klaaren points out, most of 
the rights in the Bill of Rights are guaranteed to 'everyone' rather than just to 
citizens. Moreover, citizenship in South Africa has, at long last, been stripped 
of its apartheid racialised centre. But Klaaren' s examination of legal 
developments around citizenship, and particularly tti.e influence of international 
human rights norms on this issue in South Africa, leads him to a decidedly 
mixed assessment of the state of citizenship in the new nation. He emphasises 
that post-apartheid South Africa has experienced a large-scale migration across 
its borders, and this demographic shift serves as a backdrop to his legal 
discussion. Here he notes the Constitutional Court's confirmation of the rights 
of n~m-citizens, or at any rate the rights of non-citizens with lawful permanent 
resident status, in a 1998 decision that struck down as 'discriminatory' 
regulations of the Department of Education that barred foreigners from 
~ermanent employment as teachers in state schools.4 He also emphasises the 
important educational and legal role played by the Human Rights Commission 
in this area, particularly in connection with refugee rights. But he points out 
that, despite the Constitution's protection, legislation and regulations contain 
many distinctions between citizens and non-citizens. Indeed, in t]Je final 
Constitution, in good part at the instance of the ANC, South Africa restricted to 
C~tizens two rights that the Interim Constitution had granted to everyone - the 
right to reside anywhere in the nation and the right to select an occupation. In 
the field of popular legal culture, moreover, Klaaren finds grave reason for 
concern, in the' contestation of citizenship' playing out on the streets, sometimes 
Violently. He concludes that a concept of 'post-national citizenship' - in which 
people enjoy rights and duties as people, rather than as members of particular 
nation-states - 'is both losing ground and losing steam', and more broadly 
cautions us that '[i]n citizenship as well as beyond, the human rights character 
of constitutional law cannot be taken for granted'. 
Penelope Andrews focuses on equality, certainly one of the central concerns 
?f the new constitutional order, and in particular on women's status and rights 
in post-1994 South Africa. She draws attention to specific ways in which 
apartheid ensured the perpetuation of women's subordinate status, while 
pointing out that traditional institutions and laws also played their part. As she 
explains, a combination of apartheid (European) and traditional laws and 
attitudes (African) culminated in a peculiar brand of South African masculinity, 
11 
The Post-Apartheid Constitutions 
one that surely contributes to the current widespread violence against women. 
Women have mobilised in response to these conditions, and Andrews discusses 
the efforts they have made to shape the Constitution so as to remedy these 
problems, notes the achievements embodied in the constitutional text, and 
points to the relevance for South African women of the impressive theoretical 
and organisational strides towards achieving gender equality made by global 
feminists and activists in the last few decades. At the same time, she points to 
the enormous resources - economic, legal, political and cultural- that will need 
to be harnessed in order to overcome the stubborn obstacles to women's 
emancipation. Although she is ultimately optimistic about the capacity of 
women to ensure that women's rights are not afforded a secondary place in 
the national transformation agenda, she believes that women will need to be 
consistently vigilant about ensuring that their issues remain central to national 
debates. In this appraisal of a nation embracing equality as a value but struggling 
to implement it in practice, Andrews's account of gender equality in South 
Africa surely exemplifies the current struggle for equality on many other fronts 
as well. 
South Africa is a country of great diversity as well as great inequality, and 
so it faces particularly acutely the task of respecting differences while also . 
ensuring equality and impartial, effective governance. Firoz Cachalia explores • 
these issues in his essay on 'Constitutionalism and Belonging'. Firmly rejecting ; 
consociationalism- as an ill-conceived and unnecessary reification of group ' 
difference, he argues that' constitutionalism' can establish the sovereignty of a 
single South African people while also limiting that authority in ways that 
protect minority rights. He maintains that 'liberal-democratic political 
institutions provide an attractive normative institutional framework for 
accommodating our need to belong to a community and for acknowledging 
diverse cultural identities, without sacrificing the individual interest in . 
autonomy and impartiality'. From this philosophical starting point, Cachalia 
goes on to analyse the South African Constitution and in particular two cultural 
rights guarantees, found in sections 30 and 31 of the final Constitution. In • 
general, he calls for a broad understanding of cultural rights, and for a sensitive 
balancing of those rights against the grounds for limitations upon them. In 
particular, as he explains in discussing section 31(2), which makes the exercise 
of cultural rights in conjunction with others (protected by section 31(1)) subject· 
to the other provisions of the Bill of Rights, 'an absolutist, literal reading of 
section 31(2)' would be a mistake because it 'would in effect ... read section 
31(1) out of the Constitution, where there is a conflict between dominant,. 
majoritarian, secular values and religious and cultural ones. Little scope would ' 
then remain for any expression of such difference'. As he emphasises, the, 
Constitution calls on South Africans 'to reconcile its many competing· 
commitments', a far from simple task, but it has also created a Constitutional• 
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Court with the ultimate responsibility for this function. As such, Cachalia 
co~cl~de~, '[t]he Court is ... not merely.a "counter-majoritarian" but a nation-
bmldmg institution'. 
South _A£i:ica's divisions, of course, are not merely cultural, and achieving 
true_equa~ity ~n ~ou~h Africa requires much more than accepting diversity and 
barnng discnmmahon. As everyone recognises, the country's vast gulfs of 
~ealth_and privilege must also be bridged, and to this end the final Constitution 
-ma~ important departure from the Interim Constitution - guarantees a range 
of socioeconomic rights.What these rights are to mean, however, has been less 
~han clear. Although the Constitutional Court insisted in the certification 
{~dgem~nt that these rights were, at l~ast in so~e respects, justiciable, rather 
_an bemg merely hortatory declarations - the1r meaning and enforcement 
ffill · d -remame to be developed. Sandra Liebenberg focuses on one enforcement 
system, the duty of the Human Rights Commission under section 184(3) of the 
C tit · 
~ns_ ution to 'require relevant organs of state to provide the Commission 
with information on the measures that they have taken towards the realisation 
of t~e rights in the Bill of Rights concerning housing, health care, food, water, 
:ocial secur~ty, education and the environment'. Drawing especially on the 
S n~erstandmgs developed under the International Covenant on Economic, 
~cial and Cultural Rights - a document that influenced South Africa's own 
~ill 0 ~ ~ghts - she sets out a comprehensive and far-reaching framework for 
~dentifying violations of the socio-economic rights, based on the state's duty 
t? respect', 'to protect' and 'to promote and fulfil' the rights articulated in the 
Bill 0! Rights. Her framework points to many forms of conduct that may 
c~nShtute violations, including' arbitrary termination of social security benefits 
without a f · h · g' d · · · 
. a1r earm - a epnvation of access to social security, and hence a 
failure to 'respect' this right; the lack of effective legal remedies by which 
:mber~ of relative~y pow:rle~s groups, ~uch as women, can protect themselves 
m socio-economic depnvat10ns - a failure to 'protect' access to these rights· 
and f ·1 · ' 
_a ai ure by the state to make 'decisions ... based on a principled 
consideration of the resources required to meet its constitutional commitments 
;s. a matter of priority'. The duty to 'progressively' achieve these rights - a 
. allure to_ 'promote and fulfil' these rights. Utilising the theory and practice of 
International enforcement, Liebenberg outlines comprehensively the 
P;ocedural, substantive and participatory steps that need to be in place to give 
e feet to these obligations.s 
. Stephen Ellmann also considers the scope of South Africa's socio-economic 
nghts but · ·1 · h f . - . 
. , pnman y mt e context o exammmg another question· the 
mterp t ti . . · 
re a on of the provis10ns that extend the Constitution's reach to private 
Cactors: 01:1-e such provision, section 239, defines 'organs of state' - to which the onstitution n ·1 1· . l ecessan y app ies - m anguage that potentially encompasses 
many seemingly private 'functionar[ies] orinstitution[ s ]'. Another, section 8(2), 
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declares in strikingly ambiguous terms that '[a] provision of the Bill of Rights 
binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, 
taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of ariy duty imposed 
by the right'. Ellmann approaches the interpretation of these two clauses in 
light of American jurisprudence deciding when state action - normally a 
requirement for the application of the US Constitution - is present. With this 
jurisprudence in mind, he argues that a number of not-entirely-public 
institutions do fall under section 239, but that the main work of applying the 
Constitution to private actors should be done under the rubric of section 8(2). 
As to 8(2), Ellmann argues that although it clearly makes the Bill of Rights 
potentially applicable to altogether private actors, the section should be 
interpreted to include an inquiry into the extent of the connections between 
the 'private' actor and the state. An actor's connections with the state, Ellmann 
maintains, help to measure the potential harm that actor can do, the moral 
responsibility others should feel, and the moral claims to exemption from public 
duties that the actor may have. These suggestions, he hopes, will assist the 
South African courts as they undertake to extend the domain of constitutional 
rights from a focus just on the behaviour of the state to a concern with the 
behaviour of citizens as well. 
Against this background of constitutional innovation, protecting the right 
of free speech might seem almost routine. But the long-established status of 
this right in constitutional democracies does not mean its force is spent. On the 
contrary, as Woolman and Majola demonstrate, the implications of the right of 
free speech are likely to be felt in many fields of South African life, some of 
them perhaps unexpected. Writing in light of the massive statutory suppression 
of speech under apartheid, Woolman and Majola focus on an area of law for .. 
which the courts were primarily responsible, the common law of contempt. · 
Referring to a range of cases running up to the late 1980s, they document a 
disturbing record of courts' privileg[ing] the interests of the judiciary and other , 
legal institutions over the interests of free speech, fair trials, individual rights ' 
and unfettered public discourse'. In 1988, the Appellate Division began to reform 
this area of law to bring it in line with contemporary jurisprudence elsewhere · 
in the world. Even now, after the adoption of the new Constitution, the authors • 
observe that the law of contempt apparently still criminalises a range of· 
'expressive conduct', but they take heart from the Constitutional Court's careful 
and calm handling of the challenge to its own integrity in the SARFU case.6 ' 
They consider this decision 'a model for how a public institution ought to 
respond to issues that fall along South Africa's many fault lines .... [and] for 
how South African courts should engage the occasional reckless accusations 
made by litigants'. Finally, the authors outline a constitutional doctrine of 
contempt. Such a doctrine would not condone disorderly conduct in the court,• 
which obviously needs to be curbed, but might well protect reporting about 
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cases that is now barred by the sub judice rule; would surely protect political 
criticism of the courts that might in the past have been said to 'scandalise the 
court'; and would require much more attention to the fair trial rights of those 
individuals who do face charges of contempt. 
While these chapters cover many of the most important areas of 
constitutional rights protection, their value is not primarily as a survey of areas 
of constitutional law. Rather, they all look at the new Constitution as a work in 
progress. What the Constitution ultimately means will be a result of the 
disciplined reflection of the judges charged with interpreting it, but also of the 
focused advocacy of lawyers, the commitments of political parties and the beliefs 
of South Africa's people. A constitutional culture is now being built; these essays 
both report on it and seek to contribute to its preservation and growth. 
The Institutions Created by the New Constitutions 
The new constitutions themselves recognised the need for institutional 
protections for the democratic South Africa they sought to create. These took a· 
variety of forms, some familiar to constitutional observers elsewhere and some 
more novel. The contributors to this section of the book assess several of the 
most important: the structural allocation of power between the national 
government and the provinces; the role of the Constitutional Court, and of the 
lower courts and the police; and the functions of the Human Rights 
Commission. 
Nicholas Haysom focuses his attention on the federal features of South. 
Africa's final Constitution, and sketches the tensions between and possibilities 
of national and provincial power. His essay begins with an overview of the 
negotiations around federalism, a debate so hindered by the history of apartheid 
Sou~h Africa's perversion of federalism into the bantustan system that 'the 
parties agreed to drop the "F" word and to embark on an inquiry into an 
appropriate system of constitutional government whose objective would be to 
promote nothing other than good and effective government', government 
embodying 'accountability, democracy, effectiveness and efficiency, and the 
capacity to cope with regional and cultural diversity'. Even so, these issues 
remained intensely contested, and Haysom points out the extensive treatment 
of the division of power between the national and provincial governments in 
th
e Constitutional Principles through which the Interim Constitution bound 
th
e ~rafters of the final Constitution. The Constitutional Court ultimately found 
!he first draft of the final Constitution unacceptable in part on the ground that 
it had, contrary to the requirement of Principle xviii.2, substantially diminished 
th
e powers of the provinces - a conclusion Haysom assesses critically. In any 
even~, the model of cooperative government that was ultimately adopted was 
predicated on the recognition that different levels of government may have 
concomitaht interests in the same governmental functions. To promote 
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cooperative federalism the drafters of the final Constitution replaced the Senate 
with the 'National Council of Provinces' (NCOP) which was designed to 
engender a more active and independent role for the provinces in the national 
government's decisions, as opposed to the Senate, which tended merely to 
reflect and reiterate the policies of the national majority party, the ANC. Haysom 
recognises that there is room .to question whether the NCOP is succeeding in 
this goal (and whether the provinces are capable of carrying the responsibilities 
the Constitution envisaged for them), but he concludes by offering a reasonably 
optimistic prognosis of the functioning of the NCOP which after its first year . 
in operation, appeared to have dealt competently with the tasks before it. 'As 
the political landscape changes- and it surely will over time - and if the current 
provincial framework remains intact, the NCOP will come into its own.' 
While the allocation of power between the national government and the 
provinces will, ideally, promote diversity and protect against an overweening 
central government, the body most important to the protection of rights and 
the maintenance of limits on power in South Africa may be the Constitutional 
Court. Patric Mtshaulana's essay reminds us how thoroughly the creation of a 
Constitutional Court breaks with _South Africa's past, with its legacy of 
parliamentary supremacy and the failure of the judiciary to protect adequately 
the fundamental rights and freedoms of all South Africans. He believes that 
'[b]y bestowing on judges the task of guarding and protecting the supremacy 
of the Constitution, the Constitution has sharpened lawyers' sensitivity towards 
justice. It will probably redeem the profession from an apathy, resignation and 
despair that characterised it in the time of Parliamentary sovereignty.' Moreover, 
Mtshaulana applauds the innovations in the criteria for appointment of 
Constitutional Court judges, namely that they are no longer drawn exclusively 
from the ranks of senior counsel-predominantly whites- but can also include 
attorneys and academics. At the same time, he analyses the role of the Judicial 
Service Commission (JSC), the body created to promote transparency in the 
selection and appointment of judges. He suggests that, although the JSC as 
presently constituted does provide for considerable input from the legal 
profession, the role of the State President in appointing JSC members should 
be cut back, to better insure the independence of the judiciary and avoid the 
politicisati<?n of apartheid days, when the appointment of judges was purely 
at the discretion of the ruling National Party. He is also concerned that the final 
Constitution's reworking of the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court may 
have undercut minority political parties in Parliament, by restricting their power 
to present legislation to the Court for 'preventive' review prior to its concrete 
enforcement. Finally, surveying several of the Constitutional Court's decisions, 
Mtshaulana discusses the manner in which the Court is developing a 
constitutional and common law jurisprudence in line with the new 
constitutional order. He concludes by emphasising that the Constitutional Court 
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now shares its power of constitutional review with lower courts, and observes 
that '[t]he effect of this will be to infuse the Constitution into decisions of the 
court~ and to make South Africa a real constitutional democracy'. 
Diana Gordon turns our attention from the Constitutional Court to less 
lofty institutions of law enforcement: the lower courts and the police. As she 
emphasises, 'the method by which state power is exercised is no less important 
a measure of democracy than the method by which those in authority are 
chosen'. Her paper, part of a larger, ongoing study that aims to evaluate the 
trans,formation of the police and courts in post-apartheid _South Africa, finds 
that [p]olice and court reform as of early 1999 can best be characterized as 
processes of ferment and adaptation'. The judges Gordon interviewed 'all 
expre~sed firm commitment to extensive institutional reform; they now all 
repud1a~e apartheid and maintain that they had all along been politically neutral, 
forced simply to "apply the law as it is". But in her most recent interviews, 
Gord~n found some judges sceptical of concrete steps taken to appoint more 
blac~ J_udges, and she raises the possibility that the judiciary may become' more 
stratified, with lesser cases shifted to lower courts, which will become the 
tra~ning grounds for black lawyers and magistrates'. Meanwhile, the police 
officers with whom Gordon spoke have also adopted at least 'the vernacular of 
change', and throughout Gordon's study have 'said they were relieved not to 
ha~e. to be enforcing apartheid any longer and stressed the importance of a 
shift in emphasis from what they called" control" to what they called" service".' . 
Gordon emphasises the anxieties and ambivalence police officers expressed 
but also finds that 'police monitors and researchers report an impressive amoun; 
of effor~, particularly in the townships, to develop more mutually trusting and 
protective relationships'. She also emphasises that South Africa, with its long, 
th
ou?h troubled, history of 'traditional, non-state methods for maintaining 
public safety in many African communities', might be able to develop these 
n?n~state institutions of community protection ... as exponents of democratic 
criminal justice'. 
. One of the many creative features of the South African Constitution is that 
it does not rely only on courts or police to protect its people's rights. Chapter 9 
of the Constitution also establishes a number of governmental institutions 
whose duty is to promote human rights and monitor the government's 
performance of its functions. Among these is the Human Rights Commission, 
~
nd Karthy Govender, one of its members, discusses the HRC's structure and 
its work in his essay. He begins with an examination of the constitutional 
protection of the HRC's independence. On this score he notes that 
ap • I 
P0 tntments are made on the vote of a majority of the National Assembly, 
~
nd observes that a special majority requirement (say, a 60 per cent vote) 'would 
a~e ~eant that the candidate enjoys the confidence of more than just the 
maJonty party'. He is also troubled by the provision for removal of HRC 
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members by majority vote of the National Assembly, and argues that courts 
should stand ready to review removal decisions and that many of the 
requirements of natural justice should govern the decision making process in 
order to protect the HRC' s independence and impartiality. Similarly, he points 
out the importance of ensuring that the HRC is directly accountable to 
Parliament and entitled to defend its.budgetary requests before Parliament, 
rather than being absorbed under the aegis of one of the government's own 
ministries. He notes that '[t]he executive branch of government, Parliament 
and the various chapter 9 institutions are in the process of redefining their 
relationships' on these lines as the result of a recent Constitutional Court 
decision.7 Then Govender turns to the work of the Commission. As he 
emphasises, the HRC's mandate is extremely broad, but the Commission has 
identified '[t]hree key areas' on which to focus: racism, social and economic 
rights, and the administration of justice. He discusses the Commission's work 
in each of these fields, ranging from its highly controversial examination of 
media racism to its determined efforts to elicit from government departments 
the reports on the status of socio-economic rights that the Constitution requires, 
and concludes that '[t]he Commission engages with the South African society 
in a holistic manner in order to create a rights conscious culture'. 
To be sure, only time will tell whether the institutions meant to safeguard 
South African democracy succeed in that task. But it is important to understand 
the protective structures South Africa has put in place, and to appraise both 
their strengths and their imperfections. The essays in this section thus provide 
both an historical snapshot of the new systems at work, and a guide for political 
actors and citizens concerned to make these systems as strong and as protective 
as they can be. 
Conclusion 
South Africa's 'rights conscious culture' is still being born and shaped. If 
American history is any guide, the only certainty may be that South Africa will 
soon encounter problems and devise solutions that will respond to exigencies 
the framers did not foresee. If the new Constitution is a success, however, the 
rights it protects and the institutions it establishes will continue to govern the 
nation for years, and even generations, to come. It is our hope that this book 
will help illuminate the genesis of this remarkable new rights culture, candidly 
identify the problems and challenges that it faces, and assist in its full realisation. 
October2000 
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